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Riggs: The United Nations as a Policy Instrument

the united nations

as a policy

instrument
ROBERT E RIGGS

in the eyes of its members the united nations is judged by
its capacity to increase or restrict the ultimate reach of national
policy it can remain viable as long as members believe that the
usefulness of the instrument outweighs the limitations upon
their freedom of action in a general sense the organization
was established precisely for the purpose of limiting national
freedom of action the freedom to engage in aggressive war
framers of the charter recognized that they were creating an
external source of influence upon their national policies but in
the minds of most statesmen certainly american statesmen the
organization was conceived as a means of restricting other
countries the aggressive ones if the united nations were
not to be an instrument for achieving important national goals
what good was it viewed in this light the united nations
must be evaluated primarily as an instrument of national policy
this essay will concentrate upon its characteristics as an instrument of united states policy
Idea lists may protest that the function of the united natidealists
ions in world politics is construed too narrowly if it is regarded
as an instrument of national policy from a practical standpoint however there is no better way to evaluate its success or
failure national governments are the agencies which speak
for people in international politics each must be concerned with
the interests of its own people as it interprets them to regard
the goals of united states foreign policy as wholly compatible
with the goals of all other right minded peace loving states
would be comforting but this view is true only if indeed it is
ever true with respect to vague and generalized long run objectives
jec tives nearly all may agree on the desirability of peace
well being and respect for individual
justice economic wellbeing
worth and dignity here all stand on common ground east
1I
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hs of the cold war have
even the great goliaths
Goliat
no quarrel but in the short run encounters in which policy is
actually made and executed a general coincidence of national
policy goals is much harder to find consequently united natwell being cannot
ions contributions to peace justice and wellbeing
readily be evaluated in terms having general application the
united nations contributes to these things only as they are
made concrete by interpretation particularly by governments
which are the actors in international politics if governments
can agree on interpretations so much the better if they cannot
evaluations will differ in any event the united nations is
valuable to the united states only as it furthers identifiable
policy objectives whether other countries share those objectives
or not in this sense and with this justification the united nations will be discussed as an instrument of national policy
THE USES OF THE U N instrument
in the lexicon of policy instruments the UN is usually regarded as an extension of diplomacy dag hammarskjold has
called it an instrument for negotiation among and to some
an instrument added to the time
extent for governments
honored means of diplomacy for concerting
conc erting action by governconcerning
ments in support of the goals of the charter 1 As an extension
gers
fers manifest advantages
offers
of diplomacy the united nations of
in matters in which nations from all parts of the world have a
legitimate interest with the exception of switzerland mainland
viet nam and
china the three partitioned states of germany vietnam
korea all countries of importance in world affairs are included
in UN membership the new states emerging from the metamorphosis of old colonial empires are now taking their seats
within the organization almost concurrently with the attainment
of independence thus consultations and negotiations on a wide
multilateralized
lateralized almost universalized
variety of topics can be multi
on the shortest notice 2 the advantages to a country of having
meets

west and

the indispensable role of the united nations united nations review
ig.16
lg
16
vol 4 oct 1957 pp16
pig
the UN political process has been described in greater detail elsewhere

but a brief recapitulation seems appropriate here for fuller discussion see
robert E riggs politics in the united nations urbana U of illinois press
11 44 and passim james N hyde
united states participation in
1958
pp
ap 1144
international organization vol 10 feb 1956
pp
ap
the united nations
22
34 benjamin H brown and joseph E johnson the US and the UN
2234
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a listening post tuned simultaneously to reports and views from
all parts of the world are not to be minimized the physical

proximity of many of the permanent UN missions facilitates
frequent contact the UN building itself is a magnet which
daily draws to neutral ground representatives from most countries whether or not a major organ is in session its commodious
offices lounges meeting halls and corridors provide ideal
anet
anci
congregating spots for groups of delegates the procedures and
habits of multilateral interchange developed at the UN are no
small contribution to the clarification of issues and outlining
of settlements if settlements are indeed feasible the mediatory and expert services of the secretariat are another peculiar
UN contribution to successful negotiation
on the other hand if a problem involves only two or a
few powers the UN may be less conducive to an amicable settlement than another locale certainly there is little reason to
hope that a disagreement which the soviet union and the
united states cannot solve at washington or moscow can be
by moving the site of negotiations to new
more easily settled bymoving
york if the issue has engendered ill will questioning of good
faith or clash of vital interests carrying it to an open forum
may invite all of the disadvantages of goldfish bowl diplomacy
matters of regional concern may be much more expeditiously
handled in a regional organization than in the general assembly where the majority of delegations present have only a
peripheral and a few perhaps a sinister interest in the problem NATO family squabbles like the three cornered cyprus
imbroglio may find their way to the UN but not because of any
manifest advantages for reasoned negotiation cyprus was
thrown into the UN arena because negotiation had failed and
greece hoped to try pressure indirectly the prospect of perennial debates in the assembly so injurious to the morale and
prestige of NATO spurred the parties to achieve the ultimate
diplomatic settlement outside the UN but only in a very left
handed fashion can the UN be given credit for facilitating negotiati ons
tiations
As the cyprus affair aptly illustrates the united nations
foreign policy association headline series no 107
43
pp
ap 41
4143
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can be used for other purposes than diplomatic negotiation
states come there as often to broadcast propaganda to foreign
and domestic audiences as to engage in serious negotiation
this is especially true of formal meetings where orators some
with speeches polished to the last affected pause and carefully
phrased innuendo are apparently convinced of the proposition
that all the world s a stage the UN has other uses as well by
automatically multilaterizing every issue raised there it provides opportunities for the influential to exert their influence
upon matters which otherwise would not directly concern them
ization may also serve some states by legitimizing
multilateral
multilateralization
Multi lateralization
policies which other states would find unacceptable if carried
on outside the UN framework if the elements of world opinion
reached through the UN have any real force the organization
skillfully used can become a means of subtle coercion in the
case of korea coercion assumed the less subtle form of military
force the successful if limited use of the organization as an
operating agency for economic and social programs is another
illustration of UN extra diplomatic activities
in wielding this many faceted tool of foreign policy the
united states works primarily through its permanent mission
to the united nations an expertly staffed body of well over a
hundred officials and administrative personnel headed by a
permanent representative to the united nations as chief of
mission it is for all practical purposes except administrative
control an embassy to the united nations 3 well supplied with
subject matter and geographic area specialists for year round
operations the mission is bolstered by additional teams of experts sent down from washington for special UN meetings
including the annual general assembly sessions and the semiannual meetings of the economic and social council in the
autumn five to ten amateur diplomats are also attached to the
1955 when henry cabot lodge jr became permanent representsince 1953
ative the precise administrative status of the mission has been somewhat
anomalous according to the organization chart the mission head should be
responsible to the assistant secretary of state in charge of the international
organization bureau in the department of state however because of mr
Elsen
eisen hower
lodge s special personal and political relationship with president eisenhower
he was given quasi cabinet status along with the UN job thus while being
nominally and for administrative purposes responsible to the bureau head he
has had a direct pipeline to the president as well
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mission as official delegates and alternates to the general assembly
from their park avenue citadel the delegates and advisers
sally forth to represent the interests of their country if the
object is to score propaganda points off a communist competitor
argument alone may be enough usually however votes must
be marshalled in sufficient numbers to secure formal adoption
of a resolution expressing the approved point of view or authorizing
thorizing the desired action in this task united states representatives
senta tives begin with important advantages they speak for a
country with great military power economic resources and a
non
recognized position of leadership among noncommunist
communist countries but these are only the foundations of influence technique is also crucial and the strategy of winning UN majorities
begins well before the mission personnel go out to garner votes
in the planning of US positions every reasonable effort is
made to consider the views and interests of other countries incl
cluding in many instances advance consultation with representatives of the countries most vitally concerned if this is done
well the vote catching will be easy our position will be their
position advance preparation can never be ideally thorough
however and the process of consultation and adjustment may
continue up to the final vote always the preferred approach is
to find an area of common interest wide enough to take in a
majority without pressure crucial votes are secured in the heat
of battle by adding a co
cosponsor here a new paragraph there or
sponsor
a minor deletion or change of phraseology occasionally a more
devious approach may be used that of persuading a friendly
delegation to present the american resolution so that the origin
of the program is obfuscated and some delegations relieved of
the embarrassment of sup
supporting
portingaa united states proposal on a
sensitive topic if other means fail friendly persuasion may
sometimes yield to pressure in order to win reluctant or indifferent delegates telegrams to the home governments persistent
badgering in lounges and corridors allusions to the possible
repercussions in congress and perhaps a smattering of old
fashioned horse trading may be involved great care must be
taken to assure that only the right arms are twisted and that
these are not broken for malice might well be the fruit of pres
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sure misguidedly unskillfully or too persistently applied
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
each deliberative organ of the united nations has its particular competence procedures traditions and political configu rations each must be used by the united states according
figurations
to its peculiar limitations and potentialities the general assembly is the most inclusive in scope and membership and undoubtedly the most important there is essentially no subject
impinging on international relations which it cannot discuss if
the members want to the charter limitation upon the right to
intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state has in practice been vitiated by the tendency
of the assembly to construe its own authority broadly although
the assembly is constitutionally prohibited from making a
recommendation with regard to any dispute or situation being
considered by the security council 5 discussions of the same situation may take place concurrently in both bodies the assembly s role is enhanced by its electoral functions the nonpermanent members of the security council and the trusteeship council and all members of the economic and social
council are elected by vote of the general assembly the
assembly shares with the security council the responsibility of
admitting new members selecting the secretary general and
appointing members of the international court of justice
through its power of recommendation control of the UN
budget and its right to receive and review annual reports from
the other major organs the assembly exercises supervisory
authority over the economic and social council the trusteeship council and the secretariat leaving aside the question of
legal obligation the secretariat invariably attempts to carry out
assembly recommendations while ECOSOC and the trusteeship
council usually do individual members of the assembly although not legally bound by its recommendations are less dilicarrying
gent in ca
frying them out but most prefer to give at least the
appearance of compliance whenever possible
in the autumn the permanent missions to the united nations
can anticipate a substantial increase in the level of activity as
UN charter

ikid
ibid
wid
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delegations from more than eighty member states converge on
new york for the annual sessions of the assembly ordinarily
the sessions convene in mid september and end in december
although the practice of postponing sessions until november
during american presidential election years is becoming well
established once the session is formally terminated the assembly will not meet until the following autumn unless called
into special session by a request of the security council or a
majority of the members the unwieldy method of request by
a UN majority has never been used but on five different occasions
sions 1947
ca
19471958
1958 the assembly has met at the request of the
security council four times to deal with problems in the explosive middle east and once in response to soviet suppression
of the 1956 hungarian revolt 7 the assembly has been resourceful in devising alternatives to the special session when faced
with problems which require supervision or assembly action
during nine months of the year when it does not ordinarily
meet one method has been the establishment of subsidiary
bodies with special supervisory or watch
dog functions 8 anwatchdog
other expedient frequently used is to recess the regular session
temporarily and authorize the assembly president or the secre
tary general to reconvene the session whenever necessary under such an arrangement the seventh assembly resumed its activities
tivi
ties in the spring of 1953 and met again in august to act on
the korean armistice agreement more recently because of
the hungarian crisis the eleventh session did not formally end
until september 1957 ten months from its opening date and
just in time for the twelfth session to begin

this was

done in 1952 and again in 1956
the first two special sessions in 1947 and 1948 were regular special
sessions called to discuss the fate of the british palestine mandate the last
three have been special emergency sessions convened by the security council
under the terms of the assembly s 1950 uniting for peace resolution which
makes the assembly subject to call on 24 hours notice on a procedural vote
of the security council the first and second special emergency sessions
were held concurrently in november 1956 to deal with the suez and hungarian crises the most recent met in august 1958 to discuss US military
intervention in lebanon and other problems of the middle east
an example is the now defunct united nations commission on korea
which was performing an observational assignment in korea at the time of
the north korean invasion A more ambitious but largely abortive attempt
the interim committee of the assembly first established in 1947 as a general
purpose committee of the full membership remains officially in existence but
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of course no guarantee that the assembly when
convened will act quickly it can as evidenced by the suez crisis
in that instance the special emergency session met on november 1 at the request of the security council deliberating almost
continuously throughout the day and night the assembly
fire resolution in the small hours of the mornceasefire
adopted a cease
ing november 2 less than 24 hours after the session had begun ordinarily however due deliberation rather than speed
characterizes the assembly regular agenda items are supposed
to be submitted at least sixty days in advance of the session
although special items may be later proposed these must be
approved by the general committee a steering body composed
of the principal officers of the assembly and its committees
and subsequently submitted to the whole assembly for acceptance general committee recommendations are usually approved without debate except for the most controversial items
although this stage is relatively expeditious the committee
stage which follows is usually not each of the seven principal
committees to which items are allotted according to subject
matter classification gives representation to all member countries 9 all members do not speak on every issue but each is
entitled to speak if it wishes on a particularly important or
controversial question committee discussion of an item may
is

last several weeks nearly two months were consumed in the
committee discussion of the partition of palestine the com
mitee
citee s report is ultimately submitted to the plenary meeting
of the assembly for final acceptance amendment or rejection
A simple majority governs all committee decisions but formal
assembly resolutions on important matters require a two
thirds majority of those voting yea or nay 10
still abortive owing to a soviet boycott the soviet union regarded it quite
correctly as an attempt to circumvent the veto bound security council
the committees are commonly designated numerically eg first committee second committee etc by subject matter classification they are 1 I
2
the economic and financial comthe political and security committee
4
the
3
the social humanitarian and cultural committee
mittee
5
the administrative and budgetary committee
trusteeship committee
and 6 the legal committee the seventh committee is known as the special
political committee prior to 1956 the ad hoc political committee
abstentions and absences are not counted in the computation of a two
thirds majority some types of important matters are specified in the charter
the assembly may designate others by a simple majority
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the process

just described is an extension of diplomacy but
it is also a legislative process in which the criterion of success
is a voting majority every issue is a separate battle and every
draft resolution will have peculiarities which attract or repel
individual votes in general however the assembly maintains
rather stable political alignments which permit fairly accurate
prediction of the fate of some types of issues this predictability
is a boon to state department planners when preparing their
legislative program and positions for a forthcoming general
assembly experts in the permanent mission and in the bureau
can usually calculate in advance give or take a few votes
what the final decision on most proposals will be they cannot
of course always predict what types of vote catching compromises the russians or others will raise on controversial issues
this adds an element of uncertainty and surprise which if
skillfully exploited can sometimes lead to unexpected tactical
defeats of the united states
the most common and convenient method of analyzing the
political complexion of the assembly begins with the delineation of voting blocs some of which have formal arrangements
for periodic caucusing by bloc members for voting purposes
the most significant bloc alignments are as follows
soviet bloc
latin american
USSR
argentina
ukraine
bolivia
brazil
chile
colombia
costa rica
cuba
dominican republic
ecuador
el salvador
guatemala

byelorussia
czechoslovakia
poland

haiti
honduras

yugoslavia
israel
china
finland

mexico
nicaragua
panama
paraguay
peru
uruguay
venezuela
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western
australia
austria

belgium
canada

denmark
france
greece
iceland
ireland
italy
luxembourg

netherlands
new zealand
norway
portugal
spain
sweden

turkey
union of south africa
united kingdom
united states
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afro asian
afghanistan
burma
cambodia
ceylon
ethiopia
guinea

ghana
india
indonesia
iran
iraq
japan
jordan

laos
lebanon
liberia
libya
malayan federation
morocco

nepal

pakistan
philippines
saudi arabia
sudan

thailand
tunisia
turkey
united arab republic
yemen

also a member of the arab league
some catalogs of bloc alignments might list NATO western
europe or the commonwealth separately members of the
commonwealth both old and new meet regularly while the
assembly is in session to discuss issues of mutual interest but
as a group they do not show much voting cohesiveness less
regularly representatives of western european countries have
collective consultations as do NATO members if pertinent
issues arise for voting purposes however the more recent additions to the commonwealth belong with the af
ro asian
aslan bloc
afro
and the countries of western europe NATO and the old commonwealth
mon wealth have enough interests in common to be regarded as
a single western bloc turkey is somewhat of an anomaly
being represented in both NATO and the formal caucus deli
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be
berations
rations of the afro asian bloc for the present classification turkey is with both groups china finland israel and
yugoslavia lacking sufficient affinity of interest and outlook
with any of the established groupings are treated here as members of no bloc
of the numerous agenda items which come to a final vote
in any session of the assembly probably a majority will be
adopted by unanimous consent or something closely approximating unanimity most of these relate to administrative detail
confirmation of appointments or other matters not affecting
the vital interests of states others affect vital interests but do
not give rise to marked conflicts of interest although a strong
clash of interests may develop on issues in any subject matter
classification the most persistent and fundamental cleavages
center around the cold war colonialism and the problems of
the world s underdeveloped majority
on questions basically involving east west conflict the
united states can almost always muster large majorities this
may require careful position preparation earnest consultation
and hard work in the UN lobbies but it can be done of the
21 votes in the western bloc at least 18 will ordinarily be
cast for the united states position typically south africa may
be absent in protest against assembly discussion of its racial
policies and one or two of the others may be absent when the
ballot is taken or perhaps abstain for special reasons the latin
american group of 20 votes should be good for a conservative
minimum of fifteen on an east west security issue an allowance being made for unpredictable absences or abstentions
among the afro asians the precise voting configuration will
vary with the nature of the issue and in the case of a few with
a change in domestic regimes another conservative estimate
might count at least ten and possibly as many as twenty from
this group of the four non bloc countries israel will probably
sustain the west as will nationalist china yugoslavia and finland characteristically will abstain on the basis of these conservative
serva tive estimates the vote in favor of the united states position would be 46 18 from the western bloc 15 from latin
america 10 from the afro asian group and two from non
bloc countries the total of 46 is not an absolute two thirds
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majority 55 votes but it is easily enough in view of the
potential opposition opposing votes will include all nine of the
soviet bloc but not necessarily anyone else on rare occasions
a few afro asian countries or yugoslavia may vote with the
soviet bloc but latin america western europe and the eng
lish speaking commonwealth are not likely to yield a single
one usually the result will be even more lopsided
lop sided on a straight
east west security issue this alignment might be modified
substantially however if the security issue is clouded by association with colonialism or if it also involves other elements
not directly related to the cold war
debate and voting on colonial issues reveal another fundamental cleavage in the assembly but united states interests are
usually less vitally affected than with east west security questions the one american administered trusteeship is a strategic
area subject to review by the security council rather than the
general assembly united states administration of its nonself
non self
governing territories is above serious reproach and there are no
outstanding problems of suppressed self determination in any
american territories britain france south africa belgium
and the netherlands are the countries whose vital interests have
been most deeply affected by colonial issues aired in the UN
for the sake of solidarity with its NATO allies or in protest at meddlesome interference by the assembly majority in
matters of territorial administration best handled by the administering powers the united states may sometimes speak and
vote on the side of the colonial minority other battles will
find the united states casting a silent and uneasy abstention
occasionally its delegates will join the anti colonial majority
spurred by conviction or the exigencies of UN politics not infrequently a moderate resolution may win the support of the
united states and most of the colonial powers
the structure of majorities on colonial questions in the
assembly is particularly fluid and complex A few examples
from the record of the twelfth assembly may illustrate some of
the variations on a moderate approach to the problem of
general assembly resolution 1143 XII see official records of the
general assembly 12th
121h sess plenary meetings ap
pp 369
70 south africa was
36970
boycotting the assembly in its annual protest against alleged interference in
her internal affairs
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10 20 burma and
south west africa the final vote was 50
501020

nine communist states voted in opposition twenty countries
abstained 15 of the 20 were afro asian votes and all the
other including the united states and all of the colonial
powers except south africa voted in the affirmative on the
cyprus question in the same assembly the noncommunist
non
communist
members of the assembly were almost evenly split into three
segments 22 in favor 24 opposed and 24 abstaining the
soviet bloc favored the resolution making the affirmative vote
total 51
31 latin american states were almost evenly distributed
among the three groups afro asians were about equally
divided between affirmative and abstention except for three
in the negative group and the western bloc voted chiefly in
the negative 12 the west irian issue to exhibit a third arrangement found the afro asians and communists almost solidly
in favor of the resolution abetted by five latin americans and
greece western europe and the old commonwealth supported by nine latin american votes china and israel lined
up almost solidly in opposition and abstaining were 6 latin
americans the united states and turkey finland cambodia
and liberia the vote was 41
29 11 13
412911
the cleavage between developed and underdeveloped
countries in the assembly is not so often expressed in voting
upon resolutions as it is in the accompanying debate marked
differences of viewpoint often separate the united states as
chief donor of financial resources from the recipient underdeveloped majority but the tendency in recent years has been
to draft compromise resolutions capable of winning unanimous
or near unanimous votes the united states has made some
concessions to pressures for bigger aid programs while the
majority have usually if reluctantly recognized that a large
scale UN economic development program without the support
of the united states and other major capital exporting countries
is tantamount to no program if the underdeveloped nations
chose to press their majority they might be able to adopt very
grandiose paper programs fortunately they have not done so
on most occasions
UN yearbook 1957 p 76

official records

of the

general assembly

12th sess

plenary meetings

p 547
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A number of UN observers have suggested that the new
membership of the united nations enlarged by the admission
of twenty three states since 1955 has eroded united states influence in the assembly the point may be more clearly illustrated by listing the twenty three new additions according to
bloc membership
As tun
non bloc
soviet bloc
ajro
asian
tau
ian bloc western bloc
afro aslan
cambodia
austria
albania
finland
ireland
ceylon
bulgaria
ghana
italy
hungary
guinea
portugal
romania
japan
spain
jordan
laos
libya
morocco
malayan

federation

nepal
sudan

tunisia

only five votes were added to the west while four sure
votes accrued to the soviet bloc and a net gain of twelve was
registered by the afro asian group 14 expressed in percentages
of the total membership the new assembly shows a definite
shift in favor of afro asia and the soviet bloc the
total voting strength of western europe NATO and the
256
25.6 as comold commonwealth remains virtually constant 256
26.7
pared with the former 267
267 and the small group of non bloc
states maintains the same relative strength latin america and
afro asia however exchange positions the twenty latin
american votes which were one third of the total in the old
25
assembly now account for less than 2570
the new members
from africa and asia raise their bloc voting strength from the
267
former 2677o
to more than a third in the new assembly pro26.7
267
26770
portionately the soviet bloc has had the greatest accretion of
power although the actual increase is less than three percentage
points
despite this shift of the assembly center of gravity toward
one vote was lost to this bloc in 1958 when syria and egypt merged
in the united arab republic
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the areas least susceptible to united states influence the practical consequences for united states policy have not been severe
members of the mission must contact more delegations and
calculate the odds more carefully to obtain the required majorities the necessity for compromise has increased somewhat A
few more abstentions are apparent and occasionally the soviet
opposition acquires an additional vote or two but the new
configuration of the assembly has thus far not prevented the
united states from securing two thirds majorities on vital issues on colonial questions the position of the anti colonial
factions has been strengthened but most colonial questions on
which the united states votes with the minority would have
found the united states in the minority in the 60 vote assembly
the addition of new members has added to the pressures but
has not significantly affected the voting alignments on issues
of economic assistance and development
the following table of assembly voting on certain perennial issues may graphically illustrate the impact of the new
membership upon voting trends 15
korea
disarmament
apartheid west irian
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958

1 23
35
35123
11 11
38
381111
40 10 10
401010
6 8
41
4168
56 5 12
56512
6 14
59
59614
70 5 4
7054

5 3
52
5253
0 5
54
5405

23 4
33
33234

unanimous

unanimous

5 0
53
5350

40
25 13
402513
41
29 11
412911
not voted on

unanimous
56
9 15
56915
49 9 22
49922

5 1
54
5451
0 5
55
5505
5 4
50
5054
44
0 1i 1i
44011
8 9
57
5789
54
9 16
54916
54
9 17
54917

examination of the apartheid and west irian questions neither
of which directly involve the prestige or vital interests of the
united states shows that the capacity of majority coalitions to
adopt resolutions was not affected one way or the other the
affirmative vote tended to be larger in the years after 1955
and in the case of west irian the number of abstentions increased markedly however both before and after the magic
number 60 was discarded in december 1955 the majorities
were adequate to assure passage of resolutions concerning the

the

points at issue and the proposed resolutions were not precisely the
same each year with each of the four questions as the occasional unanimous
agreement indicates these four were selected however because they were
perennials in which the issues did to a large extent remain homogeneous from
year to year
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south african racial policies and inadequate to endorse by a
two thirds vote the position of indonesia on west irian A
check on disarmament and the korean problem two questions
directly affecting the interests and prestige of the united states
finds american capacity to secure two thirds majorities practically unimpaired although the number of affirmative votes
did not show any significant increase the opposition was augmented only by the addition of the four soviet satellites 16 these
facts suggest that for practical purposes the erosion of american
influence due to increased membership in the assembly has
been slight the one notable difference is a greater number of
abstentions which may have the effect of limiting the moral
force or the propaganda value of the resolutions
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

the security

council originally intended to be the keystone

of the UN arch has a much more restricted use as an instrument of united states policy although the charter grants the
security council priority of action in the area of international
peace and security it has often yielded to action by the assembly so organized by charter prescription as to be able to
function continuously 17 the council in recent years has often
passed weeks at a time without having a substantial matter to
deal with each month a new president takes office as rotation by alphabetical order gives each of its five permanent members and six nonpermanent
non
permanent members an opportunity to share
the glory and sometimes the tactical advantage of presiding if
there is any discussion over which to preside
the reasons for this malaise of the security council are not
hard to find in a phrase a hackneyed one the root of the
problem is great power deadlock established so that substantive decisions require the assent of all five permanent members
plus any two others agreement among the united states
russia britain france and china is a necessary prerequisite to
action the security council acquired veto paralysis in its infancy resulting in the atrophy of many of its intended functions its military staff committee supposed to advise the
in 1956 the hungarian representative was absent hence the
votes instead of 9
UN charter
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council on military matters has for years been an institutional
appendix the armed forces the vaunted teeth of the new
organization were never placed at the disposal of the council
by special agreements under article 43 because of disagreements among the major powers in june and july 1950 the
security council authorized military action in korea but this
proved to be a set of false teeth never really under the council s control and impossible to use when the soviet delegate returned in august with divided counsels and lack of power to
enforce its decisions the security council has not always commanded the respect of governments despite the charter commitment of all members to accept and carry out the decisions
of the security council in accordance with the present charter 18 enforcement orders of the council have been sometimes
disregarded or implemented only in part
these circumstances have narrowed the security council s
usefulness to essentially two types of issues those upon which
the united states and the soviet union can agree or at least
not disagree and those from which some propaganda value

the

former category has included disputes
and outbreaks of violence not directly relating to east west conflict such as the kashmir dispute violence in the middle east
and the indonesian struggle for independence from the netherlands with respect to the latter the value of the security
council to the united states is reduced by the capacity of the
soviet delegate to forestall any substantive resolution by his
negative vote so that the united states cannot then claim the
official sanction of the security council for its position this
contrasts with the general assembly where anti soviet propositions have often been passed over the soviet negative vote
with the council s membership restricted to eleven its voice
also carries much less conviction as the verdict of world opinion however the prior claim of the council to disputes and
threats to the peace means that some actions can most appropriately
pria tely be initiated there it has the merit of availability at
times when the general assembly is not in session and the
magnitude of the issue is not great enough to warrant calling a
special assembly session the security council may also be use
ibid art 25
may be derived
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ful when the object is to draw a lone russian veto against nine
or ten affirmative votes thereby creating the appearance of

soviet intransigence
the composition of the security council assures that the
constitutional majority of seven can readily be obtained on
virtually all idues
isues affecting the vital security interests of the
united states 19 the mathematics are simple of the five permanent members britain china france and the united states
are sure pro western votes under the principle of geographical
distribution adopted by the assembly for election of non per
manent members two latin american countries always hold
seats one is allotted to western europe and one is filled by a
prominent commonwealth country these are usually safe pro
western votes unless india holds the commonwealth chair of
the remaining two council seats one is filled from the middle
east and the other from eastern europe or afro asia at worst
in recent years the eastern european or asian member might
be expected to abstain at best the member might be turkey
greece or the philippines which could be expected to vote
right on the crucial questions from 1946 through 1949 poland
and the ukraine voted with the soviet union on all issues but
since then no soviet satellite has been elected to the council
the strength of the US political position on the council may
be indicated by listing the non
nonpermanent membership for
permanent
selected years
1947

australia

belgium
brazil1
bra
colombia
.1

1950

1952

cuba

brazil

egypt

greece

ecuador

chile

poland

norway

india

netherlands

syria

yugoslavia

turkey

latin america
costa R
rica
ica
chile

venezuela

mexico

pakistan

western bloc
netherlands
france
new zealand
spam
spain

1955

1958

belgium
brazil

canada

iran
new zealand

peru

turkey

afro
airo asian
afroasian

afghanistan
sudan

pakistan

bloc

colombia
iraq

japan

panama
sweden

soviet bloc
soulet
soviet union
poland
bulgaria

1959

argentina
canada
italy
ja
japann

r

pPakistan
bistan
istan

tunisia
other
china
finland

united states
united kingdom

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

in comparison with the assembly and the security council
the eighteen member economic and social council hardly
issues not so vital to the united states might find different alignments
on admission of some new members and other issues the united states has
abstained while friends and allies have voted with the soviet union
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seems to merit the appellation of a major organ it lacks the
broad scope of action and the universal membership of the assembly although the big five are unfailingly reelected by the
assembly when their three year council terms expire ECOSOC
decisions also lack the authoritativeness that sometimes emanates from the security council when the veto is not operative
its agenda does not ordinarily extend to those dramatic disputes and threats to the peace which give such intrinsic importance to the security council although peace may ultimately depend upon the solution to world economic and social problems the discussions of the economic and social council do not
have the same urgency or popular appeal and consequently
receive scantier coverage in the press and other mass media
until 1958 the united states government did not have a full
time officer for ECOSOC affairs attached to the permanent
mission
the economic and social council is legally and politically
subordinate to the assembly and relies heavily upon the expertise of the secretariat much of its work load springs directly from recommendations of the assembly and most of its
important recommendations are referred to the assembly for
discussion and final action the second and third committees
of the assembly serve as centers for detailed review of ECOSOC
decisions in making studies reports and recommendations as
well as providing opportunity for debate and discussion
ECOSOC contributes to the understanding of world economic
and social problems yet even here much of the spadework
is performed by the secretariat and outside experts without
unduly deprecating the role of the council in instigating many
valuable studies clarifying issues through discussion and debate and formulating useful recommendations one can say
fairly that the secretariat lays much of the factual groundwork
for discussion and the general assembly makes the final deci
cisions
ECOSOC is not without value to the united states as a window for observing how the other half lives and occasionally
as a means of coming to grips with practical problems with the
shift of US soviet rivalry in the direction of economic comnevertie
petition it has achieved wider political significance neverthe
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less in the catalog of instruments for implementation of

united

states foreign policy the economic and social council ranks
far down the list despite senator sparkman s bland assertion
to the f if
ifth
th assembly that the united states had always regarded
ECOSOC as the basic instrument through which the conditions of wellbeing
well being essential to the maintenance of peace would
20
be achieved throughout the world 1120
the united states has consistently channeled outside the united nations the lion s share
of its efforts to promote the general welfare of other countries
many of the important issues discussed in ECOSOC pose
real dilemmas for the united states the multilateral approach
to promotion of human rights once so vigorously espoused by
american representatives has become almost a source of embarrassment
barras sment discussions of economic development find the
united states often on the defensive forced constantly to reiterate reasons why substantially more american aid should
not be distributed under UN auspices consideration of basic
commodity marketing problems likewise has found the united
states in an unenviable position because of unwillingness to acintergovernmental controls and guarancept the principle of inter
governmental
tees which many other governments think desirable related
schemes like the establishment of a world food reserve popular with so many members have been unpalatable to the
united states
voting majorities have been somewhat more difficult to
obtain than in the assembly or the security council because
the issues are less directly concerned with international security
the field in which american influence is most pronounced 21
the interests of the majority especially the underdeveloped
majority may not converge so readily with american interests
this was notably true during the summer session of ECOSOC
1957 when the united states found itself on the short end of a
15
1533 vote in favor of a greatly expanded UN program of economic aid to underdeveloped countries 22 such a resounding defeat on a major issue in ECOSOC was extraordinary it led to
ad committee p 61
ath sess 2d
official records of the general assembly 5th
only a simple majority is required for an ECOSOC decision
official records of the economic and social council 24th sess p 203
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subsequent revision of american policy toward UN economic
development programs but it represented the potential cleavage of interests between the united states britain and france
as principal donor countries and the vast majority of underemphasizing
developed countries and their sympathizers over
overemphasizing
the difficult issues and spectacular defeats can easily create an
erroneous impression the united states has proved capable of
effective leadership in ECOSOC on the issue of economic development american delegates have shown sympathy for the
plight of underdeveloped countries and have often been able
to win their votes by force of reason mild pressures or the
argument that aid programs without american support are unrealistic the fact remains however that the united states
must often work hard to win support for its positions majorities can be won but they are fashioned through compromise
and interspersed with occasional defeat
some issues before the council are amenable to a voting
division along east west lines and here the united states as
in the assembly and security council is usually able to marshal a substantial majority forced labor infringement of trade
union rights soviet radio jamming and the czech imprisonment of william N oatis are among the questions which have
lent themselves to such a division the membership of the 1959
comma
council given below shows the strength of the anti commu
nist bloc
bloc

afro asia
latin america
western
soviet bloc

non

bloc

percentage of toral
total membership
1954
1959
267
26.7
34.1
267
341
244
24.4
555
535
244
33.3
333
267
256
26.7
25.6
267
256
83
85
11.0
8.3
lio
llo
110
83
49
50
4.9
5.0
49
50

if an issue between the united states and the soviet union is
clearly drawn with the political implications outweighing the
economic or social formal balloting would probably find 12
in support of the united states position 3 opposed and possibly 3 sudan afghanistan finland abstaining the pro
western vote would include all of the first two groups listed
plus pakistan and china both firmly tied to the western orbit
by economic aid and military alliances as well as more basic as
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pecis of the national interest should economic and social factors overshadow the cold war conflict however the voting
pattern might be greatly altered
the admission of new members to the united nations has

affected the political complexion of the economic and social
council very little the membership has remained fixed at
eighteen despite growing clamor for increasing the number by
charter amendment the bloc arrangement of the membership
differs little from the pre 1955 pattern as the table on the following page will show latin american strength has remained
constant with four seats the western bloc strength has
fluctuated slightly but any change attributable to the admission of new members after 1955 is not significant the
afro asian group notwithstanding its enlarged membership
in the assembly has not increased its representation on
ECOSOC the award of a third seat to the soviet bloc for
1959 marks a return to a pattern followed in the first years
of the organization
As earlier noted the role of ECOSOC in united states
foreign policy has been altered somewhat by new trends in rus
so american rivalry debates have always been tinged with cold
war atmosphere on some issues impregnated with it in the
past the result was not to make the body more important but
to make its work more difficult and less productive with so
much of the cold war now being shifted to the economic and
social front however the activities of the council have lately
assumed a new importance for both the united states and the
soviet union the issues are much the same only their significance has been changed final decisions are still made largely
in the assembly and even these are not legally binding but
the united states is more concerned about the propaganda impact of ECOSOC activities there is also concern lest ECOSOC
programs and recommendations provide avoidable advantage
to the soviet union in its efforts to penetrate the underdeveloped countries soviet awakening to the possibilities of UN economic programs stands out sharply in its policy reversal with
respect to technical assistance for years the soviet union boycotted UN technical assistance refusing to contribute or suptechni
port it in any way in 1954 the attitude changed soviet technik
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clans were made available and annual pledges of four million
rubles were redeemed the rubles could be used only to purchase goods and services in russia russian technicians followed russian equipment and a new wedge had been found to
increase soviet influence in underdeveloped countries in addition to reducing slightly the overall flexibility of the UN
technical assistance programwhile
program While final action on the broad
outline of technical assistance is an assembly prerogative no
stage of the battle including the formative ECOSOC stage is
to be neglected As the stakes of both propaganda and programs
grow so does the importance of the council to the united
states the appointment in 1958 of a full time officer for
ECOSOC affairs attached to the permanent mission is an indi
dication of the growing significance of this forum for united
states foreign policy
THE trusteeship COUNCIL
the trusteeship council is the fourth major deliberative
organ of the united nations at first appraisal it appears more
as a limitation upon american policy than an instrument of it
the trusteeship system was designed primarily as a restraint
upon states administering trust territories it is a means by
which other states can exert influence upon the government of
the territories and their transition toward self government As

conditions of trusteeship the administering authorities must
render annual reports and reply to questionnaires submit to
searching and often hostile questioning in the trusteeship
council accept periodic visiting missions to inspect their trust
territories and permit dissatisfied elements within the territories to petition the trusteeship council for redress of grievances from the united states viewpoint the trusteeship system
provides an opening for other countries to pry into american
administration of the pacific islands although this opening
may serve as a stimulus to maintain high standards of administration it is doubtful that american officials regard the trusteeship system as particularly helpful in their relations with the
trust territory
however if the trusteeship council system gives others
bistered territory it also opens
inistered
administered
license to pry into american adm
a legitimate avenue for american influence upon the colonial
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policies of other countries friendly allies with dependent terri
ritories may resist suggestions tendered bilaterally as unwarranted interference in domestic affairs membership on the
trusteeship council markedly alters the relationship american
advice on the government of dependent areas not only becomes
legitimate because of the trustee relationship but it also becomes more acceptable as fellow administering authorities seek
grounds for mutual support in anticipation of the scrutiny to
which their non administering colleagues on the trusteeship
council and in the assembly will subject them through the
UN trusteeship system the united states thus has a means of
making its opinions felt in dependent areas for the good of the
peoples and the peace of the world both oft avowed concerns
of american foreign policy

given the existence of trusteeship system the trusteeship
council itself has been quite helpful to the colonial powers
because its membership is equally divided between administering and non administering states no resolution can be adopted
without the concurring vote or abstention of at least one of the
administering authorities although the american delegate
may sometimes cross the aisle to break a tie vote the administering powers have ordinarily shown marked cohesiveness as
a voting bloc As a result the split personality of the council
usually brings compromise and moderate action the influence
of the east west struggle has on the whole reinforced the tendency toward moderation though the soviet union with its
permanent seat on the trusteeship council has been critical
and often abusive the very excesses of soviet vilification have
sometimes led non administering members to vote with the
administering powers or abstain in order to avoid identification with the soviet position 23 this contrasts with the fourth
committee of the general assembly which has been a continual thorn in the flesh of administering powers with its overwh
whelming
elming anti colonial majority assuming the practical necessity of the trusteeship system with international supervision and
accountability the trusteeship council can be regarded as a
see james N murray jr
bana U of illinois press 1957

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1960

the united nations trusteeship

system

ur-

241 43
pp
ap 24143

25

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 4

174

BRIGHAM YOUNG

university

STUDIES

moderating influence or buffer between the colonial powers
and the extremist tendencies of the assembly
THE

secretariat

As one considers the united nations as an instrument of
policy he cannot overlook the secretariat As an administrative organization the secretariat is allotted the tasks of servicing the vast number of formal meetings of UN organs and
subsidiary bodies and implementing many of their recommendations formally the secretariat is responsible to the deliberative
organs and to the charter itself not to individual member governments
ern ments As members of the organization states of course
benefit from general services which the secretariat may provide and members of the secretariat often find themselves in
a position to render more individualized assistance to delegates
in addition to numerous valuable studies and reports made
generally available the secretariat may provide special briefings to delegations on request the links of trust and confidence
which they forge with UN representatives give them access to

information which is not readily available elsewhere experience
and recognized ability of some secretariat officials make them
valuable counselors resolution drafting services are available
out of which may come judicious suggestions for substantive
provisions members of the secretariat including the secre
tary general are available as mediators or impartial third
parties in confidential efforts to resolve conflicts or aid delegations in compromising their differences the secretariat may
even take the initiative in recommending approaches to the solution of difficult problems
the secretary general is an especially useful negotiating
agent between governments which do not communicate easily
and frankly with one another his impartial status and reputation for neutrality and integrity may win for him the trust of
parties to a dispute who do not trust each other in attempting
to secure the release of imprisoned airmen the secretary gen
eral was sent to probe the intentions of communist china and
thereby set in motion a chain of events leading to the release
of the flyers frequently the secretary general has served as a
bridge between the united states and arab neutralists some
arab governments that are suspicious of alleged western im
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perialism may be frank and more tractable in dealing with the
secretary general as an intermediary dag hammarskjold s
role in negotiating with egypt for the deployment of UNEF
LJNEF
and clearance of the suez canal was highly useful if not indispensable in furthering american policy objectives in the
middle east in this instance the secretariat served as an instrument for negotiation among and for governments with a
high degree of success the secretariat may thus become a valuable adjunct of foreign policy when individual governments
themselves cannot act effectively the secretary general would
certainly resent the implication that he was the tool of any
one s foreign policy he acts when he believes the objectives
of the charter will be promoted yet in a broader sense when
his concept of charter objectives coincides with the policy obtives of particular states he becomes an instrument of their
jec
jectives
policy in this sense he has on many occasions served the united
states well
there are many important problems of international politics
for which the united nations offers no approach to a solution for the united states the major demands of national security and prosperity are better met outside the organization
yet each political organ of the united nations offers its own
special capabilities as an extension of diplomacy a propaganda
forum a source of information a center for international cooperation a channel for influence or a means of coercion considered as one tool among many available to the united states
for dealing with limited aspects of international conflict and
cooperation it modestly fulfills the intent of its founders in
extending the ultimate reach of policy
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